The battle was the final strategic offensive that the Germans were able to launch on the Eastern Front. The Germans delayed the offensive while they tried to build up their forces and waited for new weapons, giving the Red Army time to construct a series of deep defensive belts and establish a large reserve force for counter-offensives. Aware months in advance that the attack would fall on the neck of the Kursk salient, the Soviets built a defence in depth designed to wear down the German armoured spearhead. The Soviet government had foreknowledge of the German intentions, provided in part by British intelligence's Tunny intercepts. It was also hoped that large numbers of Soviet prisoners would be captured to be used as slave labour in the German armaments industry. Hitler believed that a victory here would reassert German strength and improve his prestige with his allies, who he thought were considering withdrawing from the war. The Germans hoped to weaken the Soviet offensive potential for the summer of 1943 by cutting off and enveloping the forces that they anticipated would be in the Kursk salient. ![]() On 3 August, the Soviets began the second phase of the Kursk Strategic Offensive Operation with the launch of Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev ( Russian: Полководец Румянцев) against the German forces on the southern side of the salient. ![]() On the southern side, the Soviets also launched powerful counterattacks the same day, one of which led to a large armoured clash, the Battle of Prokhorovka. After the German offensive stalled on the northern side of the salient, on 12 July the Soviets commenced their Kursk Strategic Offensive Operation with the launch of Operation Kutuzov ( Russian: Кутузов) against the rear of the German forces on the same side. The battle began with the launch of the German offensive Operation Citadel ( German: Unternehmen Zitadelle), on 5 July, which had the objective of pinching off the Kursk salient with attacks on the base of the salient from north and south simultaneously. Particularly section B agrees with my statement about holding TDs in reserve and countering assaults.The Battle of Kursk was a major World War II Eastern Front large-scale engagement between the forces of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union near Kursk in southwestern Russia during the late summer of 1943 it ultimately became the largest tank battle in history and resulted in a Soviet victory. Depending on the situation, this may be prior to or after the launching of the hostile armored attack. Tank destroyer groups attached to units whose action is defensive are usually held in mobile reserve until the enemy's main effort is indicated and then engaged in mass against the hostile armored force. In enveloping attacks, they are usually echeloned toward the interior behind the enveloping flank.ī. They follow the attack closely, moving by bounds from one position in readiness to another. Tank destroyer groups which are attached to units engaged in offensive combat assist the attack by furnishing protection against large scale counterattacks by hostile tanks. As part of the mobile reserve of the high command, they are initially so disposed as to facilitate their rapid entry into action against large armored forces.Ī. “Tank destroyer groups are intended for action against massed tank forces. Like I said I've got no intention to starting a debate or reading the entire manual for an internet argument. I'll never find that exact sentence in any manual. TBH, I'm paraphrasing things I've read from other sources. 92 for starters, particularly section 5) towards the end.
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